Constitutional conundrum
High Court to rule shortly on attempt by MPs to block judicial review
The High Court is expected to rule shortly on whether it would be a breach of parliamentary privilege for judges to consider a claim brought by the Charity Commission against the parliamentary ombudsman.
At a hearing last week, counsel for the House of Commons speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle asked Mr Justice Fordham to hold that the commission should be refused permission to apply for judicial review. In the speaker’s view, the claim is both academic and non-justiciable.
At the heart of this case are two separate complaints to the commission, each going back more than six years.
One involved a claim by Damian Murray, 67, that the Charity Commission had failed to respond properly to his serious allegations regarding the possible concealment of child sexual abuse by a charity that founded and ran a college. The ombudsman ruled in his favour in January last year.
The other involved a claim by Lara Hall, 37, that the commission failed to respond appropriately to her concerns about her sexual exploitation by a trustee at a UK charity. The ombudsman ruled in her favour in May 2024.
In an unprecedented move, MPs decided that a report on Murray’s complaint and a report on Hall’s complaint should be published under protection of parliamentary privilege.
How did MPs come to order publication of these reports last September? Are the courts now trespassing on parliament’s territory? Or is the House of Commons trying to curb the powers of the courts?
That’s the constitutional conundrum I explore in my column for today’s Law Society Gazette.
Update 1020: permission to apply for judicial review has been refused.
My decision is that the claim is academic and should not be entertained; that in any event the legal merits are unarguable; and that considerations of non-justiciability support the decision about not entertaining an academic claim.
If the claim had not been academic, and if the legal merits had been arguable, I would not have refused permission on non-justiciability grounds but allowed the case to proceed to further substantive consideration of those grounds.
Since all concerned – the Speaker, the Commission, and the ombudsman – are funded by the taxpayer I cannot avoid the thought that this is an argument over how many publicly-funded angels can dance on the point of a pin.
Or indeed: the most subtle question whether a chimaera bombinating in the void can be nourished on secondary intentions, which was debated for ten weeks before the Council of Constance. If you don’t recognise the allusion you haven’t read Rabelais and you should remedy the omission!