Terror arrests

Police move in after courts refuse to suspend ban on Palestine Action group

Twenty-nine protesters were arrested in London on Saturday, less than a day after both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had refused to suspend a government ban on the group Palestine Action.

Scotland Yard said that those detained were suspected of committing offences under the Terrorism Act 2000.

The Times understands that the protesters were released under investigation yesterday after being interviewed by counterterror police with a condition not to take part in Palestine Action protests.

Today’s Telegraph reports that Palestine Action has attempted to thwart the government ban by creating a new recruitment website.

Supporters of Palestine Action in Parliament Square on Saturday

The Metropolitan Police had reminded protesters on Saturday morning that those supporting the newly-proscribed organisation could face various charges:

• Section 11 of the Terrorism Actmakes it an offence to belong to Palestine Action. But there is an exception for those who joined before Saturday and who have not taken part in its activities since then.

• Section 12(1) makes in an offence to invite support for Palestine Action. Raising funds for the group is a separate but equally serious offence.

• Section 12(1A) makes it an offence to express an opinion or belief that is supportive of Palestine Action if the defendant is reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support it.

• Section 12(2) makes it an offence to arrange a meeting that the defendant knows is to support Palestine Action.

• Section 12(3) makes it an offence to address a meeting with the purpose of encouraging support for Palestine Action.

The maximum sentence is 14 years’ imprisonment. People who commit any of these offences are regarded by the legislation as “terrorists”.

Section 13 makes it an offence to wear an item of clothing or wear, carry or display an article in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the defendant is a member or supporter of Palestine Action. This is a less serious offence punishable with up to six months’ imprisonment.

Legal challenges

The ban on Palestine Action took effect only an hour or so after the Court of Appeal had refused a request to suspend it. Three appeal judges circulated their full written reasons shortly before midnight on Friday following a hearing that had concluded at around 11pm. They upheld a judgment given earlier that day by a single judge in the High Court.

The High Court

Mr Justice Chamberlain recalled that the home secretary had told MPs in a written statement on 23 June that she proposed to make an order adding Palestine Action to the list of organisations that are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. This followed what Yvette Cooper described as a “disgraceful attack” at RAF Brize Norton on 20 June, “the latest in a long history of unacceptable criminal damage committed by Palestine Action”.

A claim for judicial review was lodged late on the evening of Friday 27 June behalf of Huda Ammori, one of the group’s founders. Chamberlain agreed to hear an application for permission to bring proceedings during the week beginning 21 July.

In an attempt to have the ban on Palestine Action suspended until a later date, Ammori made an application for interim relief. A hearing was scheduled for 4 July.

Chamberlain heard oral submissions from 10.30am to 3.15pm on Friday. In a 26-page written judgment delivered at 5.30pm, he summarised Ammori’s assertions and the evidence of her witnesses while carefully avoiding making any findings about events in Gaza.

The judge noted that a draft proscription order had been laid before parliament by the home secretary on 30 June. An accompanying draft explanatory memorandum had said:

Palestine Action is a pro-Palestinian group with the stated aim to support Palestinian sovereignty by using direct criminal action tactics to halt the sale and export of military equipment to Israel. Since its inception in 2020, Palestine Action has orchestrated a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms that provide services and supplies to support Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), “Five Eyes” allies and the UK defence enterprise.

Palestine Action has also broadened its targets from the defence industry to include financial firms, charities, universities and government buildings. Its activity has increased in frequency and severity since the start of 2024 and its methods have become more aggressive, with its members demonstrating a willingness to use violence. Its activities meet the threshold of being concerned in terrorism as set out in the Terrorism Act 2000.

The UK government assesses that Palestine Action commits and participates in acts of terrorism. In several attacks, Palestine Action has committed acts of serious damage to property with the aim of progressing its political cause and influencing the government…

Since 2020, Palestine Action’s campaign has resulted in hundreds of millions of pounds worth of criminal damage and lost revenue…

Proscription will enable law enforcement to effectively disrupt Palestine Action. It will help undermine the convert [sic] methods that Palestine Action uses and help reduce the risk that Palestine Action radicalises people wishing to demonstrate legitimate support for the Palestinian cause into becoming members or supporters of the organisation.

The definition of terrorism in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 covers “serious damage to property” that is “designed to influence the government” and is “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”. Because the definition includes serious damage that does not involve violence against any person, endanger life or create a risk to health or safety, Chamberlain observed that it was wider than the colloquial meaning of “terrorism”.

As the judge explained, it was not his job to say whether the government had acted wisely when using its proscription power in this case. In deciding whether to make an order for interim relief, he had to answer two questions:

These are, first, to consider whether any of the claimant’s grounds of challenge raises a serious question to be tried as to whether the proscription order is unlawful. If I find that any ground does raise such a question, I must assess the strength of the case under that ground.

Secondly, and in the light of that assessment, I must balance the harm that will ensue if interim relief is granted and the claim later fails against the harm if interim relief is refused and the claim later succeeds.

In striking this balance, I bear in mind that the 2000 act confers the function of deciding when proscription is necessary in the public interest on the secretary of state, not the court; that the judgment the secretary of state has reached is entitled to considerable respect especially where, as here, it is made in part at least for reasons of national security; and that the order whose effect the claimant asks me to suspend is secondary legislation which has been affirmed by both houses of parliament.

The government had argued that judicial review was inappropriate because parliament had created a separate process under which a proscribed organisation could seek to be unbanned. But that, said the judge, did not mean there was not a serious question to be tried, at least at this stage in the proceedings.

Ammori’s lawyers had put forward eight grounds of challenge on which Chamberlain ruled:

1. The legislation does not cover a “direct action civil disobedience network” such as Palestine Action. In view of the statutory language, Chamberlain did not consider that raised a serious issue to be tried.

2. The order is incompatible with the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Proportionality depended on the evidence that the home secretary would be putting forward, some of which might be considered in a closed hearing. Chamberlain said this ground did raise a serious issue to be tried but it was not possible to say that it had a strong prospect of success.

3. Palestine Action was not concerned in terrorism because its acts were directed only at “corporate enablers of Israel’s military industrial complex” and not against the UK government. “It is a reasonable — not to say irresistible — inference from Palestine Action’s own statement of case that the attack was intended to influence the UK government to cease providing… support for Israel,” the judge said.

4. The home secretary took account of irrelevant considerations; and

5. she had not obtained the information needed to take her decision. These grounds may “face an uphill struggle”, said the judge, if it was true that, as Cooper had said, she had been given a range of detailed reports and assessments.

6. She had failed to apply her published policy. That ground might face difficulties but, again, it was necessary to await disclosure of her evidence.

7. She breached her public sector equality duty. She said that the duty was specifically addressed in the submission she received but that too depended on the evidence.

8. Palestine Action was not consulted in advance. “Even if the statutory scheme does not exclude the duty to consult in principle,” said Chamberlain, “the secretary of state had a reason not to consult. Whether such a defence succeeds will depend on the evidence.”

Turning to the balance of convenience, Chamberlain said that “if the written ministerial statement and explanatory memorandum are taken at face value, suspending the effect of the order even for a short period would deny the public important protections which the order is intended to confer”. On the other hand, “some of the consequences feared by the claimant and others who have given evidence are overstated”.

The judge concluded:

Having read the claimant’s evidence and that of the UN special rapporteur carefully, and taken note of the oral submissions made, I have concluded that the harm which would ensue if interim relief is refused but the claim later succeeds is insufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in maintaining the order in force. In reaching this decision I have borne in mind my assessment of the merits of the claim at this early stage.

Interim relief was refused.

Court of Appeal

On Friday evening, the lady chief justice Baroness Carr sat with Lords Justices Lewis and Edis to hear Ammori’s application for permission to appeal. A recording of the live-streamed hearing can be watched online. The judges rose to prepare their judgment and then delivered an oral summary, which is also available to watch back.

As the court explained, permission to appeal will be granted only where the court considers that an appeal would have a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. And the appellate court’s role was limited to deciding whether the judge erred in law or whether his decision was one that was reasonably open to him.

There were five grounds of appeal on which the three judges ruled:

1. The court erred in law in finding that it would be wrong to accord significant weight in the balance to the interests of those who deliberately to flout the law on the hypothesis that the claim was successful. “This criticism is misconceived,” said the appeal judges. Chamberlain had expressly approached the question of harm on the basis that the claim later succeeded.

2. The court erred in law because those acts of those who deliberately to flout the law attract the protection of articles 10 and 11 of the human rights convention. There was no such failure, said the appeal judges. Chamberlain had explained that it would remain lawful for the claimant, and others, “to continue to express their opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza and elsewhere”. What was prohibited was activity supporting a proscribed organisation.

3. The court erred in accepting that there was a national security justification outweighing the prejudice to those adversely affected by the order, given that the home secretary had filed no evidence to say why the order was urgent. “There is no merit in this ground,” said the Court of Appeal. Chamberlain was well aware that Palestine Action had been active since 2020 and the decision to proscribe was based on an assessment first made in March 2025. Cooper had acted promptly and with urgency following the immediate trigger events of 20 June 2025.

4. The court erred in law in its approach to human rights. “None of the points raised in ground 4 either individually or collectively demonstrate any arguable error on the part of the judge,” the Court of Appeal said.

5. The court erred in considering that the availability of an appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission was a hurdle which the claimant would in due course have to surmount. In fact, the appeal judges observed, Chamberlain had said that if the secretary of state’s alternative remedy was a good one, it “may” provide an answer to all of the grounds. It is difficult to see why that was an error of law and in any event impossible to see the comment had any material impact on the outcome of the balancing exercise.

In short, Carr and her colleagues found “no basis for appellate interference with the judge’s assessment that the balance of convenience lay in favour of refusing interim relief”.

They concluded:

We identify no arguable error of law in the judgment. Nor do we find any arguable basis for a finding that his decision was not one open to him on the evidence.

For these reasons, we conclude that there is no real prospect of a successful appeal and no other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard. Permission to appeal is refused.

Costs will be dealt with at a later date.