Apart from suggesting the issuing of handbags to every self-publicist and lawyer who has a non-lawyerly gripe, but only to those who might not already have one for reasons of parsimony, I have the following profound point to make. How would it work to say the three months should be interpreted from when someone became aware of the thing they're complaining about? Rule 12 seems clear: "a complaint must be made within three months of the matter complained of”. The matter is the tweet. There seems no other coherent way of reading it. If "the matter" were the point at which the complainant became aware it would make no sense since that can hardly be the thing that's being complained about. The implication of the piece, intentional or otherwise, is that the drafters made a mistake or were ambiguous about meaning of the 3 months. That seems implausible to me. They clearly wanted to create a time limit since they inserted one, perhaps for reasons of practicality of follow-up or to prevent trawling through ancient tweets. They could have said a year or 5 years if they'd wanted to allow for people to have a long time to spot it. The most plausible interpretation is that they felt that 3 months was long enough. That's an intent, not an error. As it is, it's perfectly reasonable to argue that the period should be extended but it seems absurd on its face to claim, as the "leading feminist barrister" does, that the rule has been misapplied or that corruption is involved.
The ‘matter complained of’ is surely that a tweet has been posted by a judge, who has identified themself with the post as it appears to users of the platform, the content of which is alleged to have been unacceptable for a judge to have posted. If a post is made anonymously, that is not ‘post’ by a particular judge. In the realm of social media, a ‘post’ by Bloggs means that Bloggs identifies themself on the platform with the post. A post physically initiated by Bloggs, but which uses a pseudonym is not a post by Bloggs, unless or until Bloggs overly identifies themself, or is identified as the author of the content. Put another way, without the publication of the identity of the poster, the crucial element of what would make it objectionable, namely that a judge had posted it, would be missing. A post cannot become objectionable as a ‘judge made post’ if it is only the judge who knows they are its author. The judge is not going to make a complaint about themself. It is akin to a cause of action in tort. The cause of action consists of two elements: an act or omission in breach of a duty (in negligence, a duty of care) AND damage being caused by that breach. It is only when the latter occurs that the cause of action arises and the limitation period starts to run.
Very interesting, thanks. I think my view, as a non-lawyer, would be that disciplinary bodies like the JCIO should operate strictly to the rules, while senior judges should have wider discretion. In the former case, there's read across to many other disciplinary bodies and I'd be very wary of making discretion so widely available: Better to write fit for purpose rules.
Thanks. My point is that the rules are clear, but have been misapplied by incorrectly identifying ‘the matter complained of’. I’d have thought that anyone applying the rules should do so in a way that gives effect to their purpose and not so as to produce a result that is plainly ridiculous.
You might very well be right in this case. I'm sure you interpret the rules in a more sophisticated way than me. I appreciate there are many differences, but I've supported a few people with professional bodies. Midwives can be interesting, actually, because parents often make a complaint to the professional body (NMC) when a small error, which didn't contribute to an otherwise disastrous outcome for the child, is noted. There's also something not quite right, it seems to me, about how schools often have gross misconduct inquiries as a matter of policy following a complaint about a teacher even where the complaint is manifestly groundless. In each case, I've found the rules are strictly interpreted and I've been grateful for that.
The JCIO and JACO are corrupt (fail to uphold the Rule of Law) in my experience. They are not investigating ‘conduct’. I haven’t looked at it for some time but as I remember, Conduct is not defined in the Act. There are common law rules for interpreting ACTS and it isn't defining a term like ‘conduct’ as what you feel like, for example, swearing or racial abuse. Judicial Conduct is actually defined by Guide to Judicial Conduct by, of all people, the Judiciary of England and Wales. But try using that on JCIO and JACO. They disregard it for no lawful reason. They are operating in Breach of Statutory duty and are a key part of a corrupt Judiciary and corrupt Civil Justice System.
JCIO told me that the appropriate way to challenge a judge’s decision or management of a case is through the appellate process. This is misleading. If a judge’s conduct is contrary to, Natural Justice or Fraud, (lack of Impartiality, Integrity, or Propriety or Diligence [as defined in Guide to Judicial Conduct]) the decision is void, and the appropriate way to challenge it, is to apply to Set it Aside Ex Debito Justitiae. You should be able to do this via the JCIO, if you cannot do it via the courts because you can’t get a fair hearing in the courts.
JACO just said, that the JCIO followed their procedures, but I was challenging their procedures by the Rule of Law. If I recall correctly, JACO refused to correspond further, so my allegations are inferred as agreed. It is time this corrupt department was sorted out.
HHJ Daniel Sawyer has form for acting inappropriately as a judge towards barristers. In 2021 he did his bit to join the mob that was seeking to expel me from the Bar for expressing my mainstream right-wing views, as I have explained on Twitter / X.
He encouraged a political activist, with views opposed to mine, to report me to the BSB for a tweet that clearly came nowhere near the thresholds for regulatory action, as the BSB concluded.
He thereby encouraged an abridgement of my free speech rights - a curtailment of my fundamental rights that a judge should never have engaged in.
What I find most objectionable is the way he acted from behind a cowardly cloak of anonymity, so that I had no idea that my detractor was a part-time judge.
His pseudonym was “Yet another tweeting barrister”.
Apart from suggesting the issuing of handbags to every self-publicist and lawyer who has a non-lawyerly gripe, but only to those who might not already have one for reasons of parsimony, I have the following profound point to make. How would it work to say the three months should be interpreted from when someone became aware of the thing they're complaining about? Rule 12 seems clear: "a complaint must be made within three months of the matter complained of”. The matter is the tweet. There seems no other coherent way of reading it. If "the matter" were the point at which the complainant became aware it would make no sense since that can hardly be the thing that's being complained about. The implication of the piece, intentional or otherwise, is that the drafters made a mistake or were ambiguous about meaning of the 3 months. That seems implausible to me. They clearly wanted to create a time limit since they inserted one, perhaps for reasons of practicality of follow-up or to prevent trawling through ancient tweets. They could have said a year or 5 years if they'd wanted to allow for people to have a long time to spot it. The most plausible interpretation is that they felt that 3 months was long enough. That's an intent, not an error. As it is, it's perfectly reasonable to argue that the period should be extended but it seems absurd on its face to claim, as the "leading feminist barrister" does, that the rule has been misapplied or that corruption is involved.
The ‘matter complained of’ is surely that a tweet has been posted by a judge, who has identified themself with the post as it appears to users of the platform, the content of which is alleged to have been unacceptable for a judge to have posted. If a post is made anonymously, that is not ‘post’ by a particular judge. In the realm of social media, a ‘post’ by Bloggs means that Bloggs identifies themself on the platform with the post. A post physically initiated by Bloggs, but which uses a pseudonym is not a post by Bloggs, unless or until Bloggs overly identifies themself, or is identified as the author of the content. Put another way, without the publication of the identity of the poster, the crucial element of what would make it objectionable, namely that a judge had posted it, would be missing. A post cannot become objectionable as a ‘judge made post’ if it is only the judge who knows they are its author. The judge is not going to make a complaint about themself. It is akin to a cause of action in tort. The cause of action consists of two elements: an act or omission in breach of a duty (in negligence, a duty of care) AND damage being caused by that breach. It is only when the latter occurs that the cause of action arises and the limitation period starts to run.
Very interesting, thanks. I think my view, as a non-lawyer, would be that disciplinary bodies like the JCIO should operate strictly to the rules, while senior judges should have wider discretion. In the former case, there's read across to many other disciplinary bodies and I'd be very wary of making discretion so widely available: Better to write fit for purpose rules.
Thanks. My point is that the rules are clear, but have been misapplied by incorrectly identifying ‘the matter complained of’. I’d have thought that anyone applying the rules should do so in a way that gives effect to their purpose and not so as to produce a result that is plainly ridiculous.
You might very well be right in this case. I'm sure you interpret the rules in a more sophisticated way than me. I appreciate there are many differences, but I've supported a few people with professional bodies. Midwives can be interesting, actually, because parents often make a complaint to the professional body (NMC) when a small error, which didn't contribute to an otherwise disastrous outcome for the child, is noted. There's also something not quite right, it seems to me, about how schools often have gross misconduct inquiries as a matter of policy following a complaint about a teacher even where the complaint is manifestly groundless. In each case, I've found the rules are strictly interpreted and I've been grateful for that.
The JCIO and JACO are corrupt (fail to uphold the Rule of Law) in my experience. They are not investigating ‘conduct’. I haven’t looked at it for some time but as I remember, Conduct is not defined in the Act. There are common law rules for interpreting ACTS and it isn't defining a term like ‘conduct’ as what you feel like, for example, swearing or racial abuse. Judicial Conduct is actually defined by Guide to Judicial Conduct by, of all people, the Judiciary of England and Wales. But try using that on JCIO and JACO. They disregard it for no lawful reason. They are operating in Breach of Statutory duty and are a key part of a corrupt Judiciary and corrupt Civil Justice System.
JCIO told me that the appropriate way to challenge a judge’s decision or management of a case is through the appellate process. This is misleading. If a judge’s conduct is contrary to, Natural Justice or Fraud, (lack of Impartiality, Integrity, or Propriety or Diligence [as defined in Guide to Judicial Conduct]) the decision is void, and the appropriate way to challenge it, is to apply to Set it Aside Ex Debito Justitiae. You should be able to do this via the JCIO, if you cannot do it via the courts because you can’t get a fair hearing in the courts.
JACO just said, that the JCIO followed their procedures, but I was challenging their procedures by the Rule of Law. If I recall correctly, JACO refused to correspond further, so my allegations are inferred as agreed. It is time this corrupt department was sorted out.
HHJ Daniel Sawyer has form for acting inappropriately as a judge towards barristers. In 2021 he did his bit to join the mob that was seeking to expel me from the Bar for expressing my mainstream right-wing views, as I have explained on Twitter / X.
He encouraged a political activist, with views opposed to mine, to report me to the BSB for a tweet that clearly came nowhere near the thresholds for regulatory action, as the BSB concluded.
He thereby encouraged an abridgement of my free speech rights - a curtailment of my fundamental rights that a judge should never have engaged in.
What I find most objectionable is the way he acted from behind a cowardly cloak of anonymity, so that I had no idea that my detractor was a part-time judge.
His pseudonym was “Yet another tweeting barrister”.
Details here:
https://x.com/jonholb/status/2032787015998005606?s=46&t=0uwpEWh88uU3d3yMpJi8dQ