Yesterday MR appeared to say on several occasions (though not as his final view) that a judge could not act on s. 6 HRA unless parties had brought him evidence that there was a threat to a judge’s human rights.
I can’t see why, on the face of s. 6, that should be the case: why can a public authority not act on the information it actually has, however it has come by it? Indeed, it would seem to me it has a positive obligation to do so.
So, to theorise, if Williams J had had private knowledge of some special vulnerability in one of CJ/1,2,3, he would have to act on it of his own motion (albeit would also have to reference it in his reasons).
I don’t say this to approve the position, rather because I see nothing in s 6 to limit the considerations of a judge to what is before him in the court.
That's a shrewd observation. I shall refer to it in the piece I'm about to publish. My only answer is that the master of the rolls was testing the arguments rather than stating a conclusion.
Echoing 98th Monkey’s response… what possible justification could there ever be for *decision makers* anonymity other than to bolster executive *control*? Deeply troubling.
I can’t seem to find any actual judicial reasoning that underpins the requirement for anonymity?
I assume that the judge was obliged to issue a reasoned decision in this matter.
‘Felixstowe’ states that there is no such thing known to law as an anonymous justice…
It is about time that the judiciary is forced to adhere to the principal of open justice.
Did you know that there is even an open justice unit embedded within the ministry of Justice the employees about a dozen people?
In a tangently related case yet to be settled much further down the pecking order two magistrates and the government solicitor(!) are trying to argue that magistrates can hold a hearing ( which incidentally is not a family court matter ) behind closed doors and that even if their actions are outside the law then they are claiming immunity from prosecution under the crown proceedings act.
The other side is arguing that they have breached their oath to to dispense law without fear or favour and that their actions are in effect Ultra vires and consequently they are not entitled to any protection under the law because they are not standing under it because they have repudiated it by their actions.
It’s all about the judiciary being accountable to the people
Thanks, Joshua, for setting the scene. Memo to self: pray put any half formed conclusion or prematurely -almost- settled starting premises on hold and, as far as possible, return to this important subject anew in the light of the appellate process and rulings thereafter. Difficult to achieve? Certainly. Essential? I have no doubt of that.
Yesterday MR appeared to say on several occasions (though not as his final view) that a judge could not act on s. 6 HRA unless parties had brought him evidence that there was a threat to a judge’s human rights.
I can’t see why, on the face of s. 6, that should be the case: why can a public authority not act on the information it actually has, however it has come by it? Indeed, it would seem to me it has a positive obligation to do so.
So, to theorise, if Williams J had had private knowledge of some special vulnerability in one of CJ/1,2,3, he would have to act on it of his own motion (albeit would also have to reference it in his reasons).
I don’t say this to approve the position, rather because I see nothing in s 6 to limit the considerations of a judge to what is before him in the court.
What am I missing?
That's a shrewd observation. I shall refer to it in the piece I'm about to publish. My only answer is that the master of the rolls was testing the arguments rather than stating a conclusion.
Echoing 98th Monkey’s response… what possible justification could there ever be for *decision makers* anonymity other than to bolster executive *control*? Deeply troubling.
The Court of Appeal is taking a suitably robust approach this morning to these issues. I shall be covering its judgment when it is delivered.
I can’t seem to find any actual judicial reasoning that underpins the requirement for anonymity?
I assume that the judge was obliged to issue a reasoned decision in this matter.
‘Felixstowe’ states that there is no such thing known to law as an anonymous justice…
It is about time that the judiciary is forced to adhere to the principal of open justice.
Did you know that there is even an open justice unit embedded within the ministry of Justice the employees about a dozen people?
In a tangently related case yet to be settled much further down the pecking order two magistrates and the government solicitor(!) are trying to argue that magistrates can hold a hearing ( which incidentally is not a family court matter ) behind closed doors and that even if their actions are outside the law then they are claiming immunity from prosecution under the crown proceedings act.
The other side is arguing that they have breached their oath to to dispense law without fear or favour and that their actions are in effect Ultra vires and consequently they are not entitled to any protection under the law because they are not standing under it because they have repudiated it by their actions.
It’s all about the judiciary being accountable to the people
Thanks, Joshua, for setting the scene. Memo to self: pray put any half formed conclusion or prematurely -almost- settled starting premises on hold and, as far as possible, return to this important subject anew in the light of the appellate process and rulings thereafter. Difficult to achieve? Certainly. Essential? I have no doubt of that.