The timing of the news that the UK is join the Council of Europe’s framework convention on AI (the “AI Treaty”) could not be more interesting. For starters, Tory ministers were decidedly against the imposition of legislation to regulate AI use in the UK. Regulation was thought as being too continental, saddling British-tech innovation with constraints and defined legal frameworks. It was seen as risky business.
Ministers often boasted that the UK housed the most thriving AI ecosystem in Europe, the 3rd largest private investment for AI companies (totalling a staggering US$ 4.65 Billion in 2022. The Bank of England revealed that 70% of UK firms operating in the banking and financial services industry use advanced algorithms for machine-learning for the purposes of credit-scoring, fraud and money laundering detection, customer profiling, risk management.
In the meantime, behind the scenes, various issues were highlighted by domestic players including CMA, FCA, ICO and Ofcom concerning AI and algorithmic bias, the lack of fairness, transparency or accountability mechanisms, and a legislative abysm that was are not addressed by GDPR, nor the Equality Act.
Now enters Labour who decides to join the AI Treaty, proposed by (lo and behold!) the Council of Europe to address (lo and behold!) human rights, democracy and rule of law. It sounds, smells and reads like regulation is just around the corner, and rightly so!
Questions remain unanswered:
Does this (re)alignment with the Council of Europe's framework mean a substantial change to the Tory’s stance on regulation? Is Labour signalling a desire to be observed as partner to the Council of Europe and one that shares similar regulatory values and principles?
Ultimately, is this “diplomacy” dressed in Treaty ascension? A small olive branch, a tiny gesture to show a different captain is at the ship, and one that wishes to extend an invitation to mend the abysmal rift created between Westminster and Brussels post-Brexit? Perhaps time will tell.
Hmm?.... Of the AI convention, you say: ‘No specific enforcement mechanism is included in the treaty but disputes may be settled through a conference of the parties.’ What does that mean?
When I was an articled clerk (as we were called: you and I trained at the same time in London, but you went to Law School at Lancaster gate, and I to Guildford) my fellow articled clerk spoke of a partner in the firm as confusing work with activity. The partner rushed around, but achieved little. Are most conventions in much the same category. Sign them and it looks as if you are doing something; but a lack of enforcement means being replaced by a ‘conference of parties’ sounds like activity with little – perhaps nothing – achieved.
In my own field of family law United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 Art 12 says that a child who is of age and understanding should be listened to:
1 States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2 For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child….
Family Proceedings Rules 2010 r 9.11 reflects this in slightly flaccid terms for financial proceedings. It says that in any application by a parent involving a ‘financial remedy’ – ie maintenance for a child – the court may order separate representation of a child and may direct appointment of a children's guardian. I wrote about the case of EL v ML [2023] EWFC 43 (B) (15 February 2023) (bailii.org) a couple of days ago (Who judges the judges? - by David Burrows (substack.com)). In that case His Honour Judge Hess (a circuit judge who sits at the family court in High Holborn) said of a father’s successful application to eliminate arrears of periodical payments ordered to be paid for his mature, but still dependant, sons:
[43] (i) I accept that the court has, in theory, the power to join a child to the proceedings under FPR 2010 Rule 9.11; but the proposition that DJ Cronshaw should have declined to approve the school fees part of the March 2021 Consent Order and instead join the children to seek their views "about whether, in truth, their father should pay school fees" [italics are his; and I do not know who he was quoting] is a surprising proposition. I asked Mr Burrows whether he had ever come a case where such a step had been taken and he was unable to identify such a case (which accorded with my own experience). I regard the suggestions that, in some way, the argument is assisted by an application of [Art 12] (if it be pursued) … is very surprising to see and I can identify no merit whatever in it.
The father had insisted the boys be privately educated at a leading boys private school. He lost his job when he had an affair with a work colleague. As far as Hess knew, the boys would have to leave their school. There was other cash available – or due to be available – to the father. In context Hess may have been right not to have made an order under r 9.11; but he might have considered it in more legalistic terms – ‘on the merits’ as lawyers say – and by reference to the welfare of the three boys.
My job requires me to read a lot of law reports on family law. With the departure of Lord Justice Ryder (a highly experienced children lawyer) from the Court of Appeal five years ago, I have seen no mention of Art 12 that I can remember from other judges of High Court or higher level.
The timing of the news that the UK is join the Council of Europe’s framework convention on AI (the “AI Treaty”) could not be more interesting. For starters, Tory ministers were decidedly against the imposition of legislation to regulate AI use in the UK. Regulation was thought as being too continental, saddling British-tech innovation with constraints and defined legal frameworks. It was seen as risky business.
Ministers often boasted that the UK housed the most thriving AI ecosystem in Europe, the 3rd largest private investment for AI companies (totalling a staggering US$ 4.65 Billion in 2022. The Bank of England revealed that 70% of UK firms operating in the banking and financial services industry use advanced algorithms for machine-learning for the purposes of credit-scoring, fraud and money laundering detection, customer profiling, risk management.
In the meantime, behind the scenes, various issues were highlighted by domestic players including CMA, FCA, ICO and Ofcom concerning AI and algorithmic bias, the lack of fairness, transparency or accountability mechanisms, and a legislative abysm that was are not addressed by GDPR, nor the Equality Act.
Now enters Labour who decides to join the AI Treaty, proposed by (lo and behold!) the Council of Europe to address (lo and behold!) human rights, democracy and rule of law. It sounds, smells and reads like regulation is just around the corner, and rightly so!
Questions remain unanswered:
Does this (re)alignment with the Council of Europe's framework mean a substantial change to the Tory’s stance on regulation? Is Labour signalling a desire to be observed as partner to the Council of Europe and one that shares similar regulatory values and principles?
Ultimately, is this “diplomacy” dressed in Treaty ascension? A small olive branch, a tiny gesture to show a different captain is at the ship, and one that wishes to extend an invitation to mend the abysmal rift created between Westminster and Brussels post-Brexit? Perhaps time will tell.
Hmm?.... Of the AI convention, you say: ‘No specific enforcement mechanism is included in the treaty but disputes may be settled through a conference of the parties.’ What does that mean?
When I was an articled clerk (as we were called: you and I trained at the same time in London, but you went to Law School at Lancaster gate, and I to Guildford) my fellow articled clerk spoke of a partner in the firm as confusing work with activity. The partner rushed around, but achieved little. Are most conventions in much the same category. Sign them and it looks as if you are doing something; but a lack of enforcement means being replaced by a ‘conference of parties’ sounds like activity with little – perhaps nothing – achieved.
In my own field of family law United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 Art 12 says that a child who is of age and understanding should be listened to:
1 States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2 For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child….
Family Proceedings Rules 2010 r 9.11 reflects this in slightly flaccid terms for financial proceedings. It says that in any application by a parent involving a ‘financial remedy’ – ie maintenance for a child – the court may order separate representation of a child and may direct appointment of a children's guardian. I wrote about the case of EL v ML [2023] EWFC 43 (B) (15 February 2023) (bailii.org) a couple of days ago (Who judges the judges? - by David Burrows (substack.com)). In that case His Honour Judge Hess (a circuit judge who sits at the family court in High Holborn) said of a father’s successful application to eliminate arrears of periodical payments ordered to be paid for his mature, but still dependant, sons:
[43] (i) I accept that the court has, in theory, the power to join a child to the proceedings under FPR 2010 Rule 9.11; but the proposition that DJ Cronshaw should have declined to approve the school fees part of the March 2021 Consent Order and instead join the children to seek their views "about whether, in truth, their father should pay school fees" [italics are his; and I do not know who he was quoting] is a surprising proposition. I asked Mr Burrows whether he had ever come a case where such a step had been taken and he was unable to identify such a case (which accorded with my own experience). I regard the suggestions that, in some way, the argument is assisted by an application of [Art 12] (if it be pursued) … is very surprising to see and I can identify no merit whatever in it.
The father had insisted the boys be privately educated at a leading boys private school. He lost his job when he had an affair with a work colleague. As far as Hess knew, the boys would have to leave their school. There was other cash available – or due to be available – to the father. In context Hess may have been right not to have made an order under r 9.11; but he might have considered it in more legalistic terms – ‘on the merits’ as lawyers say – and by reference to the welfare of the three boys.
My job requires me to read a lot of law reports on family law. With the departure of Lord Justice Ryder (a highly experienced children lawyer) from the Court of Appeal five years ago, I have seen no mention of Art 12 that I can remember from other judges of High Court or higher level.
[Sorry to be going on about EL v ML]